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September 11,, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE s 14245 
THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND 
WESTERN EUROPE 
I. INTRODUCTORY 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this 
statement to the Senate is i"l the nature 
of a summary of my impressions of re-
actions in Western Europe to the admin-
istration's new economic program. In due 
course, I shall file with the Committee on 
Foreign Relations a formal report on 
this s'..lbject. The observations which I 
make now and others which will be con-
tained in my subsequent report flow 
from a recent visit to various European 
states and, briefly, to Morocco. Some of 
these states are members of the European 
Economic Community and others are 
on the VE'rge of membership. All of them 
are affected directly or indirectly by the 
new economic policy. 
I held direct exchanges with U.S. Em-
bassy personnel and government leaders 
in seven countries. These conversations 
were supplemented, under my direction, 
by staff reports from still other areas. 
The journey culminated in Paris at the 
59th Interparliamentary Union which I 
attended for 2 days. The focus of the 
study was the new economic program al-
though in Morocco and elsewhere other 
subjects were raised. In Paris, I made 
it a point to eschew discussions of Viet-
nam with the various delegations to the 
Paris Peace Conference. 
My principal concern was to weigh 
European reactions to the new economic 
program for communication to the Sen-
ate. Wherever I went, however, I also 
took occasion to emphasize to European 
leaders the urgency of the economic 
problems at home which had led to the 
promulgation of the program. I pressed 
for their understanding of our situation 
even as the people of the United States 
have shown understanding to theirs on 
many occasions in the past. Invariably 
these exchanges were frank and friendly 
and, at the same time, reassuring of the 
continuance of a high degree of mutual 
consideration between Western Europe 
and the United States. 
II. EUROPEAN kEACTIONS TO THE NEW 
ECONOMIC PROGRAM 
The European nations have been aware 
of the economic difficulties which have 
been gathering for the past several years 
in the United States. They have watched 
the unchecked inflation, the persistent 
high level of unemployment, and the 
shifting trade flow with deep interest and 
concern. Indeed, a number of major 
European countries have long been press-
ing the United States to take strong 
measures to correct its payments deficits. 
The alarms which had been rung in 
the Senate and elsewhere had reached 
Europe: Closer at hand, European gov-
ernments also had evidence of the in-
effectiveness of the initial remedies for 
this Nation's difficulties. European cen-
tral banks were witness to gyrations in 
gold prices, periodic speculative rushes of 
dollars from one currency to another and 
other manipulations in the European 
financial markets. 
Notwithstanding these· harbingers, the 
first reaction to the new economic pro-
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gram was one of stunned surprise. Euro-
pean nations groped for a proper re-
sponse to the administration's new course 
and for new footholds for their monetary 
policies. Under EEC leadership, an effort 
was made to find a common European 
approach. It was not successful, largely 
in consequence of the great divergencies 
between the positions of France and 
Germany. For the present, therefore, the 
European nations are acting individually 
and with a variety of responses. All of 
the reactions, however, to one degree or 
another, involve some degree of free 
market determination of the present 
value of the dollar. Nor are the forth-
coming monetary conferences expected 
to make much difference in the situation. 
There was a certain inevitability in the 
initial European shock. The administra-
tion's course was a drastic change in di-
rection which for three decades, had as-
signed to a stable dollar-gold relationship 
the central role in the commerce of the 
North Atlantic nations and much of the 
rest of the world. Moreover, the impact 
was intensified by the suddenness of the 
announcement as well as hy the nature 
of certain of the specific remedies which 
the administration chose to pursue. 
The first wave of reaction has now 
passed. In a calmer aftermath the Euro-
peans tend to acknowledge that the need 
to shore up this Nation's financial posi-
tion was long past due. If there ever was 
any tendency to gloat over our economic 
difficulties, as some earlier press reports 
indicated, it has long since passed. The 
fact is, that the European stake in the 
outcome of the President's program is 
very great. The stability of the U.S. econ-
omy still lies at the base of North Atlantic 
commercial relationships. In turn, the 
well-being of all of Western Europe is 
still intimately woven into those relation-
ships. 
That the European governments are 
understanding does not mean that they 
concur in every aspect of the administra-
tion's new program. On the contrary, 
they are articulate in setting forth differ-
ences. Certain European nations, for ex-
ample, would have preferred that the 
currency readjustments take the form of 
a revaluation in the price of gold rather 
than the suspension of the relationship 
between the metal and the dollar. The 
preference for what might be termed gold 
levitation over dollar floatation is not 
too ditncult to understand. As the Euro-
peans see it, a rise in the fixed price of 
gold would not only have forestalled the 
necessity for revaluations of their curren-
cies but it would also have increased 
greatly European exchange reserves 
which are now held extensively in gold. 
There is· also concern that the pro-
posed investment-tax credit is to apply 
exclusively to purchases of U.S. origin. 
From the point of view of European self-
interest, a tax incentive for U.S. indus-
tries to "buy American" can only serve 
to reduce the competitive effectiveness of 
many European manufacturers-notably 
of machinery-in the U.S. market. The 
proposed repeal of the excise tax on auto-
mobiles is similarly regarded as a blow on 
a blow to European exports in most of 
those nations which are heavily com-
mitted to the sale of vehicles in the U.S. 
market. 
m. THE TEMPORARY IO•PERCENT ADDITIONAL 
IMPORT DUTY 
The most universal reaction to the new 
economic program, however, is reserved 
for the general 10-percent add-on, or 
surcharge, with regard to U.S. import 
duties. All of the European governments 
oppose the provision although certain 
countries are hit more directly and pain-
fully than others. Recession and unem-
ployment are now anticipated among 
certain European exporters of highly 
competitive commodities such as shoes, 
jewelry, and watches. On the whole, 
however, the European economies do 
have alternative sources of trading 
strength-notably the inner market of 
the European Economic Community and 
they appear sufficiently stable to be able 
to absorb the increase in duty without 
widespread disruption. 
There is little disposition to challenge 
this increase under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Nor is there 
any inclination to engage in or to threat-
en reprisals. The fact is that there are 
unchallenged European precedents for 
the action which has now been taken by 
the United States. 
Objections to the increase in duty are 
expressed largely on philosophical 
grounds. It is described as a step back 
from freer international trade which, to 
call a spade a spade, is what it is even 
on a temporary basis. As noted, however, 
it is not the first happening of that kind 
in the Western trading community. Oth-
er nations have made similar retrogres-
sions. That the step now looms as a giant 
one in European eyes is because it has 
been taken by the largest nation and 
over the past several decades one of the 
most consistent advocates of freer trade. 
Hence, great stress is laid on the "tem-
porary" tag which has been attached to 
the provision. The word is, at once, both 
reassuring and disturbing in Europe. On 
the one hand, the Europeans find them-
selves able to adjust to a "temporary" in-
crease and they can· also appreciate that 
a "temporary" lapse in the economic phi-
losophy which has fueld U.S. trade policy 
for decades need not be permanently dis-
ruptive of the economic relationships in 
which they have invested so heavily. On 
the other hand what troubles them is the 
possibility that "temporary" may become 
permanent. The fact is that the Euro-
peans are far more heavily dependent on 
international trade than is the United 
States. 
In the circumstances, the question 
weighs heavily; what if the add-on is 
only the opening breech? The European 
nations do not dismiss the possibility 
that the breech may be widened by sub-
sequent unilateral U.S. measures should 
the new economic p'rogram prove inade-
quate ip. showing us the way out of the 
economic doldrums. The President has 
taken the lead in offering the reassur-
ances of his administration on that score. 
During the course of my visit I empha-
sized that both the administration and 
the Congress were not predisposed to re-
treat to the d~s of Smoot-Hawley and 
the Great Depression. There is no gain-
saying the fact, however, that a doubt 
persists in Europe as to our 'course in 
the future. The fear is real. 
If developments were to bear out this 
fear of further restrictive measures, the 
consequences would be portentous for 
both Europe and the United States. For 
two decades, the people of both regions 
have profited greatly from a vigorous eco-
nomic interflow. The growing movement 
of goods and capital and, increasingly, 
skills and people across national borders 
has done much to raise living levels and 
enrich the mutual human experiences of 
Europeans and Americans. 
A reversal of that pattern on a tempo-
rary basis may have been unavoidable 
but it is nonetheless regrettable. Should 
there be further retrogression, the most 
serious damage could be done to the well-
being of both the European nations and 
the United States. In the end, both might 
well be cut loose from the moorings of a 
commonly sustained stability which has 
contributed so much to the evolution of 
peace in Europe and the North Atlantic. 
In the circumstances, too much stress 
cannot be laid on the significance of the 
word "temporary" as it is applied to the 
increase in duty. The increase in the 
import duty is, at best, an awkward and 
dubious remedy for the Nation's eco-
nomic difficulties. It does not combat in-
flationary pressures; it accommodates to 
them and, hence, contributes to higher 
prices at home. It serves as a relief for 
inefficiency rather than as an incentive 
to more efficient production. To be sure, 
the add-on may provide a breather for 
the dollar abroad but, in any durable 
sense, it will do nothing to pump new 
breath into the international financial 
position of the United States. 
IV. NATO AND THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM 
A more pointed correction of the weak-
ness in that position would involve end-
ing excessive governmental expenditures 
and especially those which are made in 
other nations. Many of these expendi-
tures seem to persist out of resistance to 
change rather than out of any significant 
relationship to the Nation's current needs 
or interests. 
It is only too obvious, for example, 
what damage has been done to the Na-
tion's economic position by an outflow 
in the range of $130 billions of dollars for 
the tragic and wasting war in Indochina. 
Yet the war goes on; so, too, do the 
expenditures, not to speak of the tragic 
waste of life and resources. 
On a smaller scale, the ex'pense of 
military bases abroad and of foreign aid 
illustrates the same point. With regard 
to the latter, year in and year out, bil-
lions have poured abroad. In many eases, 
constructive results have been scarcely 
perceptable and, sometimes, as in the 
India-Pakistan situation, the conse-
quences have been downright deplorable. 
Yet the indiscriminate outflow for aid 
continues and · even spreads further 
afield. 
The cut of 10 percent in aid which has 
been proposed this year by the adminis-
tration is to be welcomed even though 
it seems to me that it is far too meager. 
Moreover, no distinction is drawn in the 
proposed cut between what might be 
constructive and what is ineffective or 
worse in aid. 
For the PWi><>Ses of this report, the 
most pertinent example of the kind of 
excessive government expenditure which 
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tends to erode the financial position of 
the United States is the outlay for NATO 
at the present level. Clearly, the billions 
which are spent every year, directly and 
indirectly, for this enterprise bear a 
significant relationship to the weakness 
ocf the dollar abroad. In my judgment, 
these expenditures come from the hand 
of an outdated policy. It is a heavy hand 
which, fixed on the Treasury, diminishes 
the capability of the United States for 
dealing with contemmrary economic 
realities. 
That 1s not to say that expenditures 
for NATO should be eschewed for rea-
sons of economy if they are required to 
meet urgent securtty needs in accord-
ance with the North Atlantic Treaty. 
However, there is nothing in that treaty 
which constitutes a commitment to make 
expenditures at the present level. The 
phrase "at the present level" is em-
phasized because what we do 1n the way 
of contribution to NATO is the conse-
quence of our own national decision. 
Consultation with NATO allies may be 
desirable but the question of a reduction 
in U.S. Forces from their present level, 
however, is not one of international con-
sent but of unilateral determination. 
This question was reviewed by the 
Senate a few months ago and a cut 
in the U.S. contingency in Europe on 
the basis of legislative initiative was re-
jected at that time. However, the fact 
that the administration has now found 
it necessary to resort to urgent economic 
salvage operations underscores the nec-
essity for further consideration of this 
question. It is to be hoped that a cut 
might now be brought about by Execu-
tive action. If it is not, the question of a 
legislative initiative may be raised once 
again 1n the Senate this session. 
V. OBSERVATIONS ON NATO 
For the present, however, I would only 
set forth certain observations on the 
status of NATO which derive from my 
recent study abroad. It seems to me 
that-
First. The Western European nations 
remain firmly wedded to joint defense 
of the West under the North Atlantic 
Treaty. May I add, it is my hope that 
such will also be the case with regard 
to the policies of the United States be-
cause the mutual stake in the North 
Atlantic Treaty is very high. 
Second. When it comes to material 
support of NATO, the European nations 
are prepared to urge the United States 
not to make reductions in its contribu-
tion. There is no indication, however, 
that any NATO nation is ready to make 
a substantial increase in its support of 
NATO. On the contrary, it is not far-
fetched to anticipate further reductions 
in the present European effort under the 
organization. Even now what the West-
ern Europeans are doing in the name 
of NATO probably differs very little from 
what they would be doing, in any event, 
for their national defense establishments 
in the absence of NATO. 
Third. The reluctance of the Euro-
pean nations to take over any major part 
of the heavy U.S. burden in NATO is 
part and parcel of the present mood of 
Europe. The mood is one of detente and 
peace not of confrontation and war. It 
may be that this mood derives from a 
dangerously deceptive sense of security. 
It may be that the NATO command is 
still well-advised to think and plan in 
terms of imminent military conftict be-
tween East and West. That is not, how-
ever, the contemporary idiom of either 
peoples or governments on the European 
continent. Quite the contrary, the talk 
in Europe is of peace and so is the action. 
Words of reconciliation flow across the 
line of separation accompanied by ac-
celerating trade, technological exchange, 
and travel. Indeed, Communist workers 
from the East form a part of this flow 
as they move on contract into labor-
short Western Europe even as European 
private enterprise operates in Eastern 
Europe. 
The detente has been gaining mo-
mentum in Europe for several years. Even 
the Czechoslovakian intervention.in 1968 
slowed it only momentarily. Now it is 
extending rapidly from the cultural and 
economic realms into the political. The 
SALT talks, for example, were reported 
to me in Helsinki as making very good 
progress. I spent a whole day going over 
the progress being made. Moreover, while 
I was in Europe, an agreement was 
reached by the Soviet Union, the United 
States, France, and the United Kingdom 
which is designed to defuse the Berlin 
situation-incidentally, President Nixon 
played a very significant and important 
part in this-Germans of East and West 
are now engaged in itemizing this accord. 
Thereafter should come the formalizing 
of the Soviet-West German and Polish-
West German pacts which have already 
been negotiated and which will settle, for 
all practical purposes, the border ques-
tions carried over from World War II. 
To be sure, the unexpected could inter-
vene to rewrite this diplomatic scenario. 
For the present, however, developments 
in Europe underscore the antiquation of 
NATO in its present form. That is not 
to deprecate its past contribution nor the 
continuing value of the Western Alliance 
in order to meet unforeseen contingen-
cies. The problem is not with the desira-
bility of the North Atlantic Treaty; it is 
desirable and, perhaps, vital to all con-
cerned. The problem, rather, is the form 
and content of a NATO two decades old. 
Despite its so-called policy of "flexible 
response," NATO has remained rigid in 
its design for conventional warfare even 
as the confrontation which might give 
rise to that warfare has been receding 
for many years. Moveover, NATO has 
continued to be overstaffed, overmanned, 
and overfinanced by the United States 
long after the Western Europeans have 
gained the capacity to play the prepon-
derant part in whatever conventional de-
fense they may deem necessary for their 
security. 
In the circumstances, NATO engages in 
exercises designed for an era of cold war 
while the climate in Europe warms to the 
prospect of an all-European peace settle-
ment. In the circumstances, an enormous 
effort in manpower and funds disappears 
from the coffers of the United States, at 
the expense of the national economy and 
the international strength of the dollar. 
All the while, Europe uses its resources 
more pointedly for the economic well-
being and progress of its people. This 
situation highlights the need, in my judg-
ment, to face up to the anachronism of 
the current consignment of U.S. military 
forces in Europe. The presence of over 
half a million American servicemen and 
dependents in Europe is irrelevant to 
the political situation on the continent. 
The great cost of maintaining the con-
signment is damaging to this Nation's 
interests both in Europe and at home. 
VI. 1-!"'fDICATED CHANCES IN NATO POLICIES 
With or without mutual force reduc-
tions, it seems to me highly necessary 
that there be a substantial and gradu-
ated reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. 
Indeed, what value in any negotiations is 
the debilitating waste of our financial 
resources? To follow the line of reason-
ing that suggests we should keep U.S. 
forces in Europe in order to increase our 
bargaining power with the Soviet Union 
is to argue that if the present forces were 
doubled in size our bargruning power 
would be doubled. 
It should be noted that there have been 
some administrative reductions in U.S. 
force levels in NATO below the maxi-
mum of several years ago. However wel-
come, these limited economies are not to 
be confused with the financial benefit oo 
the Nation which could be derived from 
an updating of the policies which govern 
present troop-numbers in Europe. A real-
istic reading of the current situation, in 
my; judgment, indicates possible changes 
which should contribute effectively to the 
recovery of the Nation's financial health 
without in any way impairing its se-
curity. Specifically, the following meas-
ures may be practicable: 
First. A reduction in the U.S. military 
contingent in Western Europe on a grad-
uated basis within the near future. The 
critical factor in maintaining the North 
Atlantic Treaty in present circumstances 
is not the size of the U.S. military con-
tingent but the reliability of the total 
U.S. commitment. In my judgment, two 
divisions or less of U.S. forces would be 
as effective in the latter connection as 
four or more. 
Second. A substantial cut in U.S. com-
mand participation in NATO. It would 
seem most appropriate, in particular, 
that a European be designated as the 
next Commander in Chief of the organi-
zation and for the United States to take 
the initiative in encouraging such a se-
lection. 
Third. A substitution of multinaval 
NATO forces in the Mediterranean for 
the conspicuous and overwhelming pres-
ence of the 6th Fleet. . 
Fourth. A development of effective 
techniques for keeping alive the vital con-
cept of the N~rth Atlantic Treaty while 
at the same time NATO, as it presently 
exists, is cut to streamlined essentials, 
ready for prompt remobilization in the 
event of emergencies. If present political 
trends in Europe continue, this conver-
sion of NATO to standby status might 
well be possible within 5 years. 
Vll. ADJUSTMENTS IN U .. S . OOLICY AND 
AOMINIST!lA TION 
As already noted, the trends in Europe 
are toward detente. In this Nation's eco-
nomic interest, and in the interest of 
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maintaining a constructive diplomatic 
role in the evolution of peace in Europe, 
we should adjust our policies, in all re-
spects, to those trends and do whatever 
we can to encourage them. To that end, 
it seems to me that-
First. All parts of the Federal ma-
chinery, involving the administration of 
U.S. policies regarding Europe should be 
reexamined by the President and the ap-
propriate congressional committees in 
order to update procedures which may 
be still out of harmony with present 
trends. 
Second. Our policies with regard to 
Germany should be redesigned to stabi-
lize the existing situation. To that end, 
these policies should accept the perma-
nence of the two Germanies for the fore-
seeable future and encourage peaceful 
and developing contacts between them. 
They should provide affirmative support 
for ratification of the West German-Pol-
ish Non-Aggression Pact and for the 
West German-Soviet Union Non-Aggres-
sion Pact. 
Third. Finally, our policies should en-
dorse, without reluctance, an all-Euro-
pean choosing for the purpose of seeking 
among other things, a non-aggression 
treaty between the NATO and Warsaw 
Pact nations. And this meeting should be 
attended by both Canada and the United 
States. 
Vm. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
To give the direction which has been 
outlined to U.S. policy, as I see it, would 
be to point it by the compass of the 
Nixon doctrine. It would be a direction 
in accord with the mood in Europe, in 
accord with the Nation's domestic and 
international economic interests, and in 
accord with the needs of a stable peace. 
Europe may well be at a most decisive 
moment in intra-European relations and 
in relations with the United States. It is 
a moment which contains promise along 
with pitfalls. It would be tragic if we 
were to turn away from this moment 
which may olfer us an opportunity to 
cement the peace of Europe either be-
cause of a delayed and faulty reaction to 
the financial difficulties of years of diplo-
matic and military overextension or be-
cause a topheavy and aging machinery 
for the conduct of our European policy 
continues to flail at the ghosts of the 
past. 
If we fail to grasp this moment, the 
posSibilities loom large for the rapid 
growth of economic sniping and intrigue. 
From that point, it is a short distance to 
a militant economic nationalism and 
blocism and the crumbling of Western 
political unity in a general fit of recrim-
ination and reprisals. 
There need not be this slide in the 
Western community into what, in the 
end, may well be self-destructive. It 
should be possible to move out of that 
era which since World War II has had 
the United States at the core of respon-
sibility and burden without these conse-
quences. We should be able to move into 
a new and fruitful age of mutuality with 
Western Europe, within a peaceful Eu-
rope, if we will set aside the fears of the 
past and act in timely fashion on the 
facts of the present. 
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Under the previous order the Sen-
ator from South Carolina <Mr. HoLLINGS) 
is recognized for 15 minutes. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I yield 
at this time to the distinguished Senator 
from Arkansas. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I 
wish to join with the Senator from Mon-
tana and express my agreement with 
what he has just said. I think what he 
has. said has been dramatically high-
lighted and fortified by the articles which 
have recently been published in the 
Washington Post with respect to our 
Army in Europe. 
I would hope that the Senator from 
Montana would and I urge him again to 
olfer his well-directed and well-known 
amendment for the reduction of our 
troops in Western Europe. 
I congratulate the Senator on his pre-
liminary report, and I agree that it is 
high time in our own interest to reduce 
our presenc~ there and approve of these 
valious moves that have taken place. 
I certainly agree with the Senator from 
Montana and I congratulate him on a 
very fine statement. 
I wish to ask the Senator a question. 
I ask the Senator, in view of his observa-
tions and the reports on the military re-
garding the demora.lizin.g elfect on our 
troops in occupation, if it would not per-
haps be proper to again raise this ques~ 
tion for a vote in the Senate? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would agree with 
the distinguished chairman of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, and I wish 
to say to him that it is my intention to 
do so at an appropriate time in connec-
tion with an appropriate bill. There are 
a number of measures to which the 
amendment seeking to bring about a sub-
stantial reduction of U.S. forces in West-
ern Europe on a graduaJted basis could 
be attached. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I hope the Senator 
will do so. To me the reports coming out 
about the demoralization of our forces 
are absolutely horrible. I can think of 
nothing more serious with regard to our 
own military defenses and, in addition to 
that, to our reputation, to our influence 
generally in Europe and over the world. 
I hope the Senator will do so. I assure the 
Senator my support and I think he has 
a great deal of other support. I thank the 
Senator for his report. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have inserted in 
the RECORD the three articles by Haynes 
Johnson and George Wilson, which were 
published in the Washington Post over 
the past 3 days. If everyone will take the 
time to read them the articles will be 
found to be eye-opening. I am disturbed 
at the lack of morale of our troops in 
Europe. I am disturbed greatly about the 
drug traffic, the crime increase, and the 
shabby conditions under which our en-
listed men live, and I emphasize the. 
word "enlisted." I think something 
should be done because what I want 
there is an effective and lean army and 
not the kind of army we have there at 
the present time, which I think is fa.r 
from lean. It is quite to the contrary. 
Certainly, in view of the race problem, 
the drug problem, the Clime problem 
and the slackness of morale, it is not effi~ 
cient at this time. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Sen-
ator. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield to the Senator 
from Missouri. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I 
would also congratulate the distin-
guished majority leader for one of his 
typically wise and constructive observa-
tions to the Senate, this one based on his 
recent trip. 
On the floor of the Senate it has been 
stated and restated that we have over 
7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe. With 
that type and character of defense in 
Europe it still seems incredible to me 
that we have to continue to keep these 
hundreds of thousands of our conven-
tional military over there. Surely these 
countries can handle more of this prob-
lem of military bodies. 
I would Join the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations in hoping 
that, as soon as he considers it proper, the 
majority leader will again introduce the 
resolution for a reduction of our troops 
in Europe. 
A prominent physician only this morn-
ing told me that once a person is really 
"hooked"-that was his expression--on 
heroin, there is no out from his stand-
point except suicide. 
In reading these three articles referred 
to it would seem that the Army, not con-
tributing in a real sense, is creating the 
probability of additional Atticas. Re-
gardless of who is wrong or right in the 
dreadful situation that developed in that 
town in the State of New York-a sad 
business, il~deed-all this is something in 
which every American as well as every 
¥ember of the Senate should be, and I 
am sure is, deeply interested. 
Putting it mildly, the drug problem in 
the most recent article in question was 
verified to Senator PASTORE and me by 
officers and enlisted men of the Army 
when we visited Europe last April. 
I would hope, therefore, again inas-
much as I believe in Germany we a.re 
creating additional Atticas, that we 
would look further into these articles en-
titled "Army in Anguish," published in 
the Was}11ngton Post and written by two 
responsible newspapermen. 
With that in mind I have requested 
the chairman of the Committee on 
Armed Services to establish a. subcom-
mittee to investigate thoroughly the al-
legations in these articles. It is about 
time, from the standpoint of our military 
posture, that we begin to look at the 
vital problem of morale in the SeTVices, 
a characteristic of military prepared-
ness that is just as important as any 
weapons system or group of weapons 
systems. 
So again I congratulate the distin-
guished majority leader for the thought-
ful position he has presented this morn-
ing. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish 
to thank the distinguished Senator and 
to say that I believe we have to have an 
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army based not on numbers but effec-
tiveness. There is a job to be done in re-
building the Army, and I am sure the 
Congress as a whole stands ready and 
willing to participate in that effort, 
which must be undertaken for the secur-
ity of the United States. 
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, of 
course, I agree. We should have a mighty 
fine Army. I would hope this matter 
could be cleared up, not only in the 
Armed Services Committee but also, from 
the standpoint of commitment, in the 
Foreign Relations Committee, of which 
the majority leader is a member. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President,. will the 
Senator from South Car&lina yield to me 
without losing his right to the ftoor? 
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I am 
glad to yield to the Senator from 
Vermont. J 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, the remarks 
of the majority leader, the Senator from 
Montana, are very timely and should be 
heeded and will be heeded, not only in 
this body but in the rest of the country as 
a whole. 
I was at home on August 15 when the 
President made . his unexpected and 
startling announcement relative to our 
national economy and the action he pro-
posed to take. I think that, with very 
few exceptions the President's statement 
and proposed plan were very well re-
ceived even by those who disagree with 
him on many, many other things. But 
there Is also a feeling that this state-
ment must be followed up by action 
without much delay. That action must 
not be a party issue, it must not be an 
issue between the Congress and the 
White House, it must not be an Issue be-
tween industry and labor, because the 
stakes are too high and the situation is 
too serious to indulge in that kind of 
pla.y. 
It was only natural that other coun-
tries showed resentment at this state-
ment. It came unexpectedly. They were 
surprised. Many of them thought it was 
dir~ted at them, so they were not very 
happy. They do not feel very happy at 
having anyone in authority in the United 
States telling them how much they 
should revalue their own currency, which 
runs from 15 percent in Japan down to 
r.lmost nothing in some of the other 
countries. But these other countries 
have a share in this responsibility them-
selves. They forced the President to take 
the action he did, in a way. They have 
In the past subsidized their own products 
through dumping them on the rest of the 
world, particularly the United States. 
They have made internal restrictions 
against products imported from the 
United States which have been very 
costly to us and are largely responsible 
for the imbalance of our economic situ-
ation. Many of th~m have failed to ob-
serve the mandates of the United Na-
tions while expecting the United States 
to fully observe those mandates. 
Finally, I think Western Europe has 
to bear a great deal of the responsibility 
for forcing the hand of the President in 
doing what he did, because the time has 
now come, as the Senator from Montana 
has said, for Western Europe to assume 
the responsibility for their own defenses. 
I agree with him that the next com-
mander of the NATO forces should be 
a European. 
The situation now calls for consulta-
tion and cooperation, not confrontation. 
There can be no delay if the damaging 
conditions of the 1930's are to be 
avoided, because what hurts the United 
States hurts these other countries as 
well, and even more. Reverting to fort-
ress America is not in the interest of the 
United States. It could be popular at 
first. It is not in the interest of the rest 
of the world. 
I am very, very hopeful that all na-
tions, we share responsibility too, for the 
present situation and threatening situa-
tion in the world will be able to sit down 
together and work out fair and equitable 
trade agreements. 
I do not want to see this country slide 
back into isolation, although there are 
people in this great Nation of ours who 
are advocating steps that would have 
that very result. 
I think the Senator from Montana 
performed a real service, and I thank 
the Senator from South Carolina ·for 
yielding me time to say so. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
want to express my thanks to the dis-
tinguished senior Senator from Vermont 
and to assure him .I appreciate what he 
had to say. I agree with him. There is 
much more I would like to say in view of 
the interest generated, but I do not want 
to intrude myself further on the gen-
erosity of the Senator from South Caro-
lina. 
s 14249 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 47, Folder 58, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
